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‘We have yet to fully grasp the monstrous effects 
of these weapons, that the consequences of  
their use defy reason, transcending time and 
space, poisoning the earth and deforming  
its inhabitants.’
General Lee Butler USAF (Rtd.),  
National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 4 December 1996.
A new initiative has emerged over the current NPT review cycle to think 
afresh about nuclear weapons in terms of unacceptable and unmanage-
able humanitarian consequences of a nuclear conlict; to think not in 
terms of abstract concepts of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability, 
but in terms of the catastrophic impact of nuclear violence on people’s 
lives and human societies. This initiative, led by states and civil society, 
has brought a strong reaction from the nuclear-armed states. They have 
collectively argued that it undermines the NPT when in fact the opposite is 
true: the initiative emerged in response to the disarmament malaise in the 
NPT and was framed as a means of revitalising debate and action on the 
NPT’s vital disarmament pillar. The initiative is also based on the NPT’s 
fundamental recognition of the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear 
conlict as the rationale for disarmament and non-proliferation. The 
nuclear-armed states, in contrast, argue that it is wilfully idealistic and 
distracts from a ‘step-by-step’ approach to nuclear disarmament. This 
points to two different images of the NPT, but in fact there are three in 
play. This brieing paper outlines these three images of the NPT and 
nuclear disarmament in order to contextualise the humanitarian initiative 
as we approach the next Review Conference in 2015. 
Image 1: Surface devaluing
The nuclear-armed states have been subject to consistent pressure since 
the end of the Cold War to reduce the value assigned to their nuclear 
weapons through quantitative reductions in nuclear numbers and 
qualitative changes in nuclear doctrine. They have been criticised for  
slow progress and their enduring commitment to nuclear deterrence.  
The NPT nuclear-armed states reject this criticism and insist they have 
done an impressive job in de-escalating the Cold War confrontation 
through signiicant force reductions and changes in doctrine. According to 
these ive states they have made ‘unprecedented progress and efforts…  
in nuclear arms reduction, disarmament, conidence-building and  
transparency.’ They ‘note with satisfaction that stocks of nuclear weapons 
are now at far lower levels than at any time in the past half-century’ 
delivered through ‘systematic and progressive efforts’ since the end of the 
Cold War.2 
The disarmament picture is not quite as rosy as the one they paint. History 
shows that after an initial cull of nuclear weapons by the US and USSR/
Russia in the early 1990s (primarily non-strategic nuclear weapons 
through the unilateral-reciprocal Presidential Nuclear Initiatives [PNIs] in 
1991 and 1992), nuclear force reductions have proceeded very slowly. 
Strategic nuclear force reductions under the START process (the 1991 
START I, 2002 SORT, and 2010 New START treaties) as well as unilateral 
reductions by the UK and France are important and welcome. Neverthe-
less, they represent a codiication of the changed geo-strategic environ-
ment following the end of the Cold War through the consolidation of 
nuclear forces rather than any fundamental downgrading of nuclear 
weapons or radical rethinking of the commitment to nuclear deterrence. 
They signify a slow and cautious acknowledgement of the reduced 
salience of nuclear weapons in national defence and conceptions of 
global balances of power driven by a shift in defence priorities to ‘new 
wars’, regional intervention, and expeditionary conventional military 
capabilities. The PNIs, for example, were a pragmatic response to 
geo-political, inancial and technical realities rather than a sweeping away 
of Cold War doctrine as some argued.3 Acknowledgement of the reduced 
salience of nuclear weapons has been slow and cautious. 
This can be described as a post- Cold War process of ‘surface devaluing’. 
‘Devaluing’ here refers to political processes that reduce or annul the 
values assigned to nuclear weapons in terms of the perceived beneicial 
effects of their possession and deployment.  ‘Surface devaluing’ refers to 
a limited dilution of the values assigned to nuclear weapons primarily by: 
rebalancing national defence priorities away from nuclear defence; 
trimming the vast excesses of Cold War legacy nuclear forces; marginalis-
ing the idea of using nuclear weapons for theatre ‘war-ighting’4; substitut-
ing some roles previously assigned to nuclear weapons for conventional 
weapons (mainly in the US5); and some consolidation of nuclear declara-
tory policies. 
The nuclear-armed states insist this is excellent progress and fulils 
requirements for meeting their end of the nuclear disarmament bargain 
over the past four NPT review cycles from 1990 to 2010. Yet for many this 
surface devaluing of nuclear weapons is not suficient. It has left the logic 
of nuclear deterrence relatively undisturbed, the perceived legitimacy of 
threatening massive nuclear violence intact, and the idea of nuclear 
prestige largely untouched. It is a process centred on the technocratic and 
managerial orientation to arms control developed during the Cold War. It is 
a process that privileges regulation and stabilisation of inter-state strategic 
relations, a irm belief in the necessity and eficacy of nuclear deterrence, 
and a ixation on the idea of parity between the US and Russia in terms 
of a quantitative ‘balance’ in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
and warheads.6
2Image 2: Deep devaluing
Non-nuclear-armed states have consistently called for speciic measures to 
reduce the role and legitimacy of nuclear weapons in international politics. 
Three of these include negative security assurances, no irst use (proposed 
initially by China), and de-alerting. The collective purpose of these steps 
can be called ‘deep devaluing’. This image of the NPT centres on qualita-
tive changes in nuclear doctrines as an essential component of a nuclear 
disarmament process and a crucial indicator of nuclear-armed states’ 
commitments to that goal alongside quantitative reductions in nuclear 
numbers. These qualitative changes can be seen as a means of restricting 
the scope of nuclear deterrence and diminishing the value of nuclear 
weapons in national security planning and international politics. In short, 
‘deep devaluing’ refers to measures that seek to reduce the value of 
nuclear weapons as instruments of state security, power, and coercion. In 
that regard non-nuclear-armed states are quite clear that these steps are 
‘pragmatic, interim and practical measures’ pending nuclear disarmament 
and not a permanent substitute for that end goal.7 These measures have 
gone hand in hand with routine calls for further numerical reductions in 
nuclear arsenals, entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
and negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Although advocated for 
many decades, these measures found new force through the New Agenda 
Coalition formed in 1998 to pressure the nuclear-armed states to make 
substantial progress on disarmament commitments agreed at the pivotal 
1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC).8 
Negative Security Assurances
Non-nuclear-armed states have long sought legally-binding assurances 
from the nuclear-armed states that they will not be subject to nuclear 
attack or blackmail. Such assurances were considered during the 
negotiation of the NPT in the 1960s but did not survive the inal draft.9 
Since then the NPT nuclear-armed states have issued assurances at the 
UN General Assembly’s First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, 
again in 1995 ahead of the NPTREC, with further updates from the US and 
UK ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The nuclear-armed states 
have steadily codiied their NSAs in legal form for an increasing number of 
states through protocols to nuclear weapon-free zones. 
NSAs can be seen as diminishing the value of nuclear weapons  
by constraining nuclear practice through formal and legally binding 
undertakings.10 Under a universal and legally-binding NSA regime nuclear 
weapon politics would become an exclusive feature of relations between 
nuclear-armed states and, potentially, states outside the NPT or those in 
breach of NPT commitments. This would shrink the political realm in which 
nuclear weapons have salience in inter-state relations, reducing it from a 
global space in which nuclear weapons can be framed as a legitimate 
response to general ‘strategic uncertainty’ to a much narrower one deined 
by existential emergencies between a discrete number of nuclear-armed 
states pending disarmament.
No irst use
Some states have advocated a formal no irst use agreement since the 
early 1960s, again with a view to restricting the scope of nuclear deterrent 
threats and the practice of nuclear deterrence. This follows the examples 
of the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that banned possession of 
chemical and biological weapons and were facilitated by established 
norms against their use in customary international law and the 1925 
Geneva Protocol.11 A legally-binding and unconditional12 no-irst use policy 
would mean nuclear-armed states could not legally threaten pre-emptive 
use of nuclear weapons against other states (nuclear-armed or otherwise), 
retaliatory nuclear use in response to a massive conventional attack, or 
engage in nuclear ‘signalling’ during a severe crisis by iring a ‘sub-strate-
gic’ warning shot indicating intent to escalate to a full nuclear exchange 
should aggression continue.13 It would limit nuclear deterrence policy and 
planning to an exclusively defensive, retaliatory posture. This would 
consign all other potential missions for nuclear weapons to the doctrinal 
dustbin with corresponding effects on alert procedures, operational war 
plans, and potentially procurement decisions.14 NFU can be argued to 
diminish ‘requirements’ for large and diverse nuclear forces. It could 
restrict the residual deterrent value of nuclear weapons to a very discrete 
set of existential military threats to the survival of the state as a part of the 
transition to a world free of nuclear weapons. 
De-alerting
The third ‘deep devaluing’ measure advocated by non-nuclear-armed 
states is the de-alerting of nuclear weapons. De-alerting refers to mea-
sures that reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, or more 
precisely ‘implementing some reversible physical changes in  
a weapon system that would signiicantly increase time between decision 
to use the weapon and the actual moment of its launch’.15 Some de-alert-
ing has already taken place, for example the readiness of NATO Dual 
Capable Aircraft (DCA) has been reduced from hours and minutes to 
several months.16 Other nuclear forces have been de-alerted prior to 
retirement, for example weapons withdrawn from service through the 1991 
and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. 
Supporters of de-alerting see it as a means of reducing the salience  
of nuclear weapons in day-to-day national security planning. In fact, 
de-alerting is framed as having two beneicial effects: irst, an immediate 
practical effect of lowering the risk of an accidental or unintentional 
launch of nuclear weapons; and second, a longer-term effect of ‘a 
signiicant nuclear disarmament dividend through a reduction of the role 
of nuclear weapons in nuclear doctrines and therefore security policies 
overall’.17 This, again, would restrict the scope of nuclear policy planning, 
further constrain the roles and values assigned to nuclear weapons, and 
begin to address the problem identiied by Bruce Blair et al that ‘These 
postures also perpetuate a mutual reliance on nuclear weapons that lends 
legitimacy to the nuclear ambitions of other nations.’18 In essence, 
supporters of de-alerting measures view them as an important means of 
‘de-coupling’19 nuclear weapons from the broad, day-to-day calculus of 
national security by demonstrating that nuclear-armed states can learn to 
live without nuclear weapons on high-alert, or even operationally deployed 
on a permanent basis as a precursor to learning to live without nuclear 
weapons at all.
Pressure for these deep devaluing measures relects a widely held view 
that progress on the disarmament side of the NPT bargain has been wholly 
inadequate.20 Part of the problem is that nuclear force reductions are 
invariably accompanied by unequivocal commitments to nuclear deter-
rence and the necessity of nuclear weapons for national security as well as 
nuclear force modernisation programmes.21 Action 5 of the 2010 NPT Final 
Document Action Plan relects the ‘deep devaluing’ image. It commits the 
nuclear-armed states to ‘accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading 
3to nuclear disarmament’ including further reductions in all types of nuclear 
weapons, steps to further diminish the role and signiicance of nuclear 
weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, 
steps to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, steps to reduce the 
operational status of nuclear weapons systems, and steps that further 
enhance transparency and increase mutual conidence. 
At the same time, these measures have not been without criticism. 
Negative security assurances, for example, have been criticised for 
potentially reinforcing the claim of certain states to legitimately possess 
nuclear weapons.22 Arrangements that allow nuclear-armed states to enter 
into treaties forswearing use of these weapons against one group could 
tacitly reinforce their ‘right’ to hold these weapons and possibly use them 
against others. No irst use has been similarly criticised for legitimising 
possession of nuclear weapons and entrenching nuclear deterrence within 
the military doctrines of nuclear-armed states, legitimising the potential 
second use of nuclear weapons. 
Image 3: delegitimising nuclear weapons
The third contemporary image of the NPT and nuclear disarmament seeks 
to transcend these limitations. This third image is based on ‘delegitimising’ 
nuclear weapons driven by concern at the slow pace of disarmament 
progress in the NPT. This has fuelled a determination from a cross-regional 
group of states including Austria, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Switzer-
land, South Africa and Norway to exercise their political agency as 
non-nuclear-armed states and take greater ownership of the NPT’s Article 
VI commitment to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. 
This image of the NPT and nuclear disarmament moves beyond deep 
devaluing by challenging the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. It does so by 
reframing NPT nuclear politics away from a nuclear force reductions 
process governed by the nuclear-armed states and towards the unaccept-
able and unmanageable humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear 
weapons. This approach gathered momentum with the formation of a 
coalition of states ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They have 
been supported by civil society organisations committed to challenging the 
legitimacy of nuclear weapons through a comprehensive ban treaty. This 
was relected in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference 
that noted for the irst time ‘the catastrophic humanitarian consequences 
of any use of nuclear weapons and reafirms the need for all States at all 
times to comply with applicable international law, including international 
humanitarian law.’23 It was followed by further statements at the 2012 and 
2013 NPT PrepComs by Norway and Switzerland that gained widespread 
support and led to a ground-breaking conference on the humanitarian 
impact of nuclear weapons in Oslo in March 2013. The ‘Joint statement on 
the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament’ delivered at the 
2012 NPT PrepCom by Switzerland’s Ambassador, Benno Laggner, had  
16 signatories.24 This expanded to 34 nations at the UN General Assembly 
First Committee in October 2012 when Laggner delivered a similar 
statement.25 This more than doubled at the April 2013 NPT PrepCom to  
80 nations for the statement delivered by South Africa’s Ambassador, 
Abdul Minty.26  
The Oslo conference hosted by the Norwegian government attracted 128 
countries as well as several UN organisations and the International Red 
Cross movement.27 The humanitarian disarmament narrative was reiterat-
ed at the UN General Assembly’s High Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarma-
ment in September 2013, the UN Open-Ended Working Group on 
multilateral nuclear disarmament that also reported in September 2013 
and the UN General Assembly First Committee in October 2013.28 New 
Zealand delivered a further ‘Joint statement on the humanitarian impact of 
nuclear weapons’ at the latter, this time sponsored by 125 countries.29 The 
narrative was further developed at the second conference on ‘The 
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons’ hosted by the Mexican 
government in February 2014 and attended by 146 states. Austria now 
plans to host a third conference later in 2014.30
Reframing nuclear disarmament as a humanitarian imperative has 
enabled non-nuclear-armed states to re-assert the imperative of a world 
free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament under Article VI has often 
been dominated by a nuclear-armed states discourse of deterrence, 
strategic stability, arms control, and state security. Now it is being 
reframed in terms of global justice, humanitarian harm, ecological 
violence, human rights, human security, and the international rule of law. 
Many non-nuclear-armed states are committed to these themes and 
values in other issue areas and this has empowered them to challenge the 
legitimacy of nuclear weapons in new ways with the support of civil society 
organisations. It has provided a new frame based on a justiiable and 
authoritative set of rules and norms for international society rooted in 
concepts of collective security and common humanity, rather than a 
realpolitik set of rules and norms rooted in state security and balances of 
military power.31 
For some, the delegitimising process is a means of reframing NPT politics 
in order to realise a deep devaluing of nuclear weapons through the NPT. 
For others it is a means of transcending entrenched positions in the NPT 
and galvanising political support for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons as a 
framework to achieve their prohibition and elimination. As Swiss Ambassa-
dor Benno Laggner stated at the UN General Assembly in October 2012, 
‘we are encouraged by the increasing attention given to the humanitarian 
dimension of nuclear disarmament by States as well as international and 
non-governmental organizations. Switzerland is convinced that a better 
understanding of the humanitarian impact of nuclear explosions will pave 
the way to a multilateral process to prohibit nuclear weapons based on 
their destructive, indiscriminate and inhumane nature.’ 32 
The nuclear-armed states have not welcomed this intervention. They did 
not attend the Oslo or Mexico conferences based on their collective 
concern that ‘the conference in Oslo could divert discussion and focus 
away from the practical steps required to create the conditions for further 
nuclear weapons reductions. We believe that the practical, step-by-step 
approach that we are taking to progress multilateral nuclear disarmament 
through existing mechanisms, such as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty 
(NPT) and the Conference on Disarmament, have proven to be the most 
effective means to increase stability and reduce nuclear dangers.’33 This 
was reasserted in their collective statement ahead of the 2013 PrepCom 
that ‘reafirmed the historic contribution of the pragmatic, step-by-step 
process to nuclear disarmament and stressed the continued validity of this 
proven route.’34 This ignores the fact the Oslo conference was precipitated 
by the failure of the established step-by-step process and dysfunctional 
disarmament institutions to generate signiicant progress towards nuclear 
disarmament through ever deeper devaluing of nuclear weapons. 
4Conclusion
Where does this leave the NPT as we head towards the 2015 Review 
Conference? Arguably it leaves it in a very dificult place. The nucle-
ar-armed states insist they are doing well and point to progress through 
the ‘P5 process’ of discussions initiated in 2009 to establish common 
ground for further disarmament steps. They insist that the only realistic 
road map to a world free of nuclear weapons lies in a step-by-step 
approach centred on another round or two of US-Russian nuclear force 
reductions, entry into force of the CTBT, and negotiation of a issile 
material treaty. This agenda is far too conservative and the pace far too 
slow for many non-nuclear-armed states who are looking for more 
substantial quantitative force reductions and qualitative changes in 
nuclear doctrines and practices. The lack of progress has fuelled efforts by 
a group of states to reframe the debate in humanitarian terms. Rather 
than trying to yet again bridge the gap between surface and deep 
devaluing, they are looking to transcend it. They have done this not to 
score political points, or to use the new framing to squeeze another 
concession or two from some of the nuclear-armed states, but because 
human-centred conceptions of security have secured a fundamental 
legitimacy since the end of the Cold War and the consequences of using 
nuclear weapons are simply unacceptable within that paradigm. The 
authority of this approach has empowered them to challenge the legitima-
cy of possessing nuclear weapons.
The nuclear-armed states have so far dismissed this approach.  
They show little inclination to accept the fundamental illegitimacy of 
nuclear weapons or even to discuss meaningful qualitative changes in 
nuclear policies alongside further force reductions. Their strategy appears 
to have been to discredit the humanitarian approach and other recent 
initiatives such as the UN General Assembly’s High Level Meeting on 
Nuclear Disarmament in September 2013 and the UN Open-Ended 
Working Group on multilateral nuclear disarmament that also reported in 
September 2013. They may hope that the humanitarian approach will turn 
out to be a temporary feature of the nuclear weapons discussions. After a 
rocky Review Conference in 2015 they could then return to a busi-
ness-as-usual process of ‘surface devaluing’ in 2020 with a few more 
steps to report and a few more concessions to give. With that in mind, it 
remains to be seen whether: 1. the non-nuclear-armed states involved in 
the humanitarian approach can align their interests to put signiicant and 
sustained pressure on the nuclear-armed states to escalate qualitative 
and quantitative changes in nuclear weapons policies and practices with 
deliberate speed based on the illegitimacy of these weapons; and 2. 
whether they will go further and pursue a nuclear ban treaty with or 
without nuclear-armed states’ involvement.35 
This brieing summarises a longer article in the journal International 
Affairs published by Chatham House called ‘Waiting for Kant: Devaluing, 
and Delegitimising Nuclear Weapons’ 36. Its title is drawn from Ambassa-
dor Antonio Guerreiro, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Confer-
ence on Disarmament, who said in 2012: ‘The world has always been and 
will always be an unstable environment. Waiting for a Kantian universal 
and perpetual peace to commit to forswear atomic weapons simply runs 
counter to the ultimate objective of the NPT, which is the total and 
irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons.’ 37
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